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Abstract
An (A) expected (strong) bubble is said to exist if it is mutual knowledge
that the price of the asset is higher than the expected (possible) dividend. By
requiring common knowledge instead of mutual knowledge, the new concept of
common expected bubble (common strong bubble) is developed. In a simple ￿nite
horizon model with asymmetric information and short sale constraints, which
follows Allen, Morris and Postlewaite (1993), it is showed that two results hold
true for any ￿nite number of agents: First, common strong bubbles never exist
in any rational expectations equilibrium; Second, it is possible to have a bubble,
which is both a strong bubble and a common expected bubble, in a rational
expectations equilibrium, even with common knowledge of trades. Furthermore,
the ￿rst result crucially depends on the implicit assumption of perfect memory,
hence an example of common strong bubbles can be constructed in case that
agents are forgetful. Based on these results, this paper, as well as Conlon (2004),
provides a partial answer to what properties rational bubbles can have and cannot
have in a rational expectations equilibrium.
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11 Introduction
Bubbles exist in many markets, not only with those assets whose fundamental values
are hard to be determined or to be observed (stocks, for instance), but also with some
assets whose fundamental values are known to be less than the prices (￿at money, for
instance). How can bubbles be explained and what must be true for the existence
of bubbles? Though claiming that most bubbles are irrational is much easier than
interpreting bubbles in a rational way, economists have made and are still making
e⁄orts to deal with the latter.
Among the huge literature on the existence of bubbles, one strand has developed
the models based on the existence of some irrational agents, often called as noise
traders in the literature (see, for example, De Long, Shleifer, et al. (1990), Abreu and
Brunnermeier (2003), and Zurita (2004)). Papers in this strand interpret the bubbles
by the interaction between the rational and the irrational.1
Another strand of the literature, has tried to model the bubbles under the more
traditional assumption that all agents are rational.2 In such settings, an asset bubble
can be explained either by the assumption of in￿nite horizon or by the in￿nite presence
of new agents (see Tirole (1982) and Tirole (1985) for example). However, in order to
interpret the existence of a ￿nite horizon bubble3 in a rational expectations equilibrium
with a ￿nite number of agents, either change of standard assumptions (for instance,
symmetric information) or introduction of speci￿c settings (for instance, short sale con-
straints) has to be made. Thus the question comes: What is the minimum requirement
for the existence of such a rational bubble?
By the well-known no-trade theorem by Milgrom and Stokey (1982), under the
standard setting, if the initial allocation is e¢ cient relative to each agent￿ s belief, then
the common knowledge of feasibility of and voluntary participation in trade will give
agents no incentive to trade, no matter whether they have private information or not.
If there is no trade in a ￿nite horizon economy, there is certainly no bubble. Hence the
ex ante ine¢ ciency of endowment allocation, or the potential gains from trade, should
be one necessary condition for such a bubble to exist.4
By Allen, Morris and Postlewaite (1993) (AMP (1993) henceforth), private informa-
tion about the states and short sale constraints for all agents are another two necessary
conditions for the existence of strong bubbles. Under all these three together with a
fourth requirement that the agents￿trade should not be common knowledge, an ex-
ample of strong bubbles in a rational expectations equilibrium with three agents and
1Though the rational agents have incentive to take advantage of the irrational, it is possible that
noise traders may actually earn a higher expected return than rational investors do. For details, see
De Long, Shleifer, et al. (1990).
2In fact it is assumed that the rationality of the agents is common knowledge in most paper of
this strand. Under the assumption of rational expectations, these two are equivalent.
3Among all the bubble phenomena, ￿nite horizon bubbles have occurred most frequently and are
probably most puzzling.
4For a complete proof, see Tirole (1982).
2three periods5 is presented in that paper. This model captures the "greater fools"
dynamic pretty well in the sense that due to the asymmetric information agents may
hold a worthless asset at a positive price in the ￿rst period (hence the strong bubble),
in hopes of selling it in the second period to someone else who thinks it may be worth
something. In short, a rational bubble can exist under this setting because even though
everyone knows that the asset is overpriced they may still hold it with the belief that
others might think that it is valuable.
Given the success of Allen, Morris and Postlewaite model, economists are somewhat
not satis￿ed with the last assumption, the one requiring no common knowledge of
trades, since many bubbles do exist in reality with the public information of agents￿
actions. Conlon (2004), another paper quite related to the issue we addressed above,
according to my knowledge, was the ￿rst to give a strong bubble example in a similar
setting6 where there are only two agents. Since trades are automatically common
knowledge for the two-agent case, this result has questioned the necessity of assumption
of no common knowledge of trades for the existence of a ￿nite horizon bubble in a
rational expectations equilibrium. Another contribution of Conlon (2004) is that the
bubble in the model is not only strong but also robust to nth order knowledge, that
is (all agents know that)n the price is higher than any possible dividend agents will
receive.
Based on the fact of the existence of nth order bubbles, one may naturally ask
whether a bubble can be robust to common knowledge. In this paper, by requiring
common knowledge instead of mutual knowledge, we develop two new concepts of bub-
bles: common expected bubble and common strong bubble. The concept of common
strong bubble is so "strong" that it can be showed never to exist in any rational ex-
pectations equilibrium under the standard assumption of perfect memory. However,
we are able to show that within the same framework as AMP (1993) model but with
common knowledge of trades, a strong bubble can exist in the case of two agents, and
this bubble can still exist even when it is common knowledge that the price is higher
than the expected dividend agents will receive (hence a common expected bubble).
Moreover, such a bubble, both strong and common expected, is robust to symmet-
ric perturbation, and can exist for any ￿nite number of agents.7 This result, on one
hand, weakens the assumptions of the models of bubbles by reducing the four neces-
sary conditions to three, and hence improves these models￿applicability and powers
5It has been shown in that paper that there is no expected bubble in the last two period under
their framework, which will be described in section 2, hence the minimum number of periods for the
existence of a bubble is 3.
6The setting of Conlon (2004) model di⁄ers from AMP (1993) model in the sense that agents￿
information structures are determined both by the private signals they receive at the beginning of
period 1 and by the public signals they receive at the beginning of every period. The information
structures are chosen so that prices reveal no additional information.
7I will assume that each agent is distinguished from another in the sense that either their beliefs
are heterogeneous or their information structures are di⁄erent, or both. Otherwise, this result would
hold trivially since each agent can be "divided" according to endowments into any ￿nite number of
subagents.
3in interpretation. On the other hand, the surprising result of the existence of common
expected bubbles is somewhat counterintuitive but captures the idea that agents do
not rush in face of bubbles since, given the common knowledge of the heterogeneous
beliefs and the information structures, they believe that they can take advantage of it
in a later period. Furthermore, it is worth noting that the implicit assumption of per-
fect memory plays a key role in the nonexistence result for common strong bubbles: if
people might forget some information they knew before, then a common strong bubble
may happen in equilibrium.
The next section of the paper introduces the basic framework following AMP (1993),
gives four concepts of bubbles, and shows the nonexistence of common strong bubbles in
any rational expectations equilibrium. Section 3 presents a simple example of rational
bubbles with two agents, which is both a strong bubble and a common expected bubble.
Section 4 gives a counterexample of the nonexistence result of common strong bubbles
if we allow for imperfect memory. Section 5 shows the general results for any ￿nite




The same framework is established here as in AMP (1993), except that the requirement
that the trades should not be common knowledge is removed.
In the pure exchange economy under study, there are I (￿ 2) risk neutral8 agents
(i = 1;2;￿￿￿ ;I), T (￿ 3) periods (t = 1;2;￿￿￿ ;T) and N (￿ 2) states of the world
represented by ! 2 ￿. Only 2 assets exist in the market: one riskless (money) and the
other risky. There is no discount between any two periods. Each share of the risky
asset will only pay a state-dependent dividend denoted by d(!) at the end of period
T.
Agent i is endowed with mi units of money and ei shares of the risk asset at
the beginning of period 1. In each period t and in each realized state !, agents can
exchange claims on the risky asset at a state-and-period-dependent price Pt (!). Agent
i￿ s net trade in period t when state ! is realized is denoted by xit (!), and we write xi =
(xi1;xi2;￿￿￿ ;xiT), xt = (x1t;x2t;￿￿￿ ;xIt) and x = (x1;x2;￿￿￿ ;xI). Hence agent i￿ s ￿nal
consumption in state ! with net trades xi at price P (!) = (P1 (!);P2 (!);￿￿￿ ;PT (!)),
denoted by yi (!;P (!);xi), is equal to mi + eiPT (!) +
T X
t=1
xit (!)[Pt+1 (!) ￿ Pt (!)],
where PT+1 (!) = d(!). Under the assumption of identity utility function, agent i￿ s
8Agents are assumed to be either risk averse or risk neutral in AMP (1993). Here for simplicity,
I only consider the case of risk neutrality. All the results will remain valid for the risk averse case as
long as the potential gain from trade is high enough.
4payo⁄ in state ! with net trades xi at price P (!), is just his ￿nal consumption, hence
ui (!;P (!);xi) = yi (!;P (!);xi).
Each agent i has a subjective belief about the probability distribution of the state,
denoted by ￿i (!).9 8i = 1;2;￿￿￿ ;I;8! 2 ￿;￿i (!) > 0.
2.2 Information Structure
At the beginning of each period t, before observing the current price and making
the trade, agent i￿ s information about the state is represented by Sit, a partition of
the space ￿, and his price￿ and-trade-re￿ned information is represented by SPX
it .10 We
denote by sit (!) (sPX
it (!)) the partition member in Sit (SPX
it ) containing the state !.
In other words, sit (!) consists of all the possible states agent i believes he might be in
when the state ! is realized. For example, si1 (!1) = f!1;!2g means that at period 1
agent i believes he might be either in !1 or !2 when !1 is realized.
SPX
it is determined by (Sit;Pt;xt) such that
8! 2 ￿;s
PX
it (!) = sit (!) \ f!
0jPt0 (!
0) = Pt0 (!) and xt0 (!
0) = xt0 (!) 8t
0 ￿ tg
Obviously 8i = 1;2;￿￿￿ ;I;8t = 1;2;￿￿￿ ;T;8! 2 ￿;f!g ￿ sPX
it (!) ￿ sit (!).
We assume agents have perfect memory so that
8i = 1;2;￿￿￿ ;I;8! 2 ￿;8t > t
0;sit (!) ￿ sit0 (!)
Obviously this implies that
8i = 1;2;￿￿￿ ;I;8! 2 ￿;8t > t
0;s
PX
it (!) ￿ s
PX
it0 (!)
It should be noted that when agents make trades to optimize their payo⁄s, the
information they based on is sPX
it (!) instead of Sit, since it is assumed that rational
agents should make use of all the information they can obtain. As we will see, the
assumption of perfect memory plays an important role in Proposition 1, which we will
state at the end of this section.
2.3 Rational Expectations Equilibrium
Before we come to the de￿nition of rational expectations equilibrium, in order to be
consistent with the AMP (1993) model, two concepts have to be introduced ￿rst.
9We assume that ￿i￿ s are heterogeneous in order to give agents incentive to trade. For other
approaches to induce trade, see AMP (1993) for details.
10In the AMP (1993) model, they only focus on the price-re￿ned information SP
it. This is because
they assume that the trades are not common knowledge and hence agents cannot get additional
information from trades.
5De￿nition 1 (Information Feasibility) Agent i￿ s net trades xi are information fea-
sible if in each period t, xit is measurable with respect to player i￿ s price￿ and-trade-
re￿ned information, SPX
it . Formally, xi are information feasible if
8t = 1;2;￿￿￿ ;T;8! 2 ￿;s
PX
it (!) ￿ f!
0 : xit (!
0) = xit (!)g
The last part of the above expression is equivalent to 8!0;!00 2 sPX
it (!);xit (!0) =
xit (!00), which might capture more intuition than the one used in the de￿nition. Ba-
sically, information feasibility rules out the possibility of acting di⁄erently given the
same information.
De￿nition 2 (No Short Sales) Agent i￿ s net trades xi satisfy no short sales if in
each period t and in each state ! agent i￿ s holdings of the risky asset are non-negative.
Formally, xi satisfy no short sales if
8t = 1;2;￿￿￿ ;T;8! 2 ￿;ei +
t X
s=0
xit (!) ￿ 0
As shown in AMP (1993), this no short sales condition is necessary for the existence
of a bubble in a rational expectations equilibrium. It should be noted that there is no
constraint on the short sales of money.
Denote by jt (!) the join of s1t (!);s2t (!);￿￿￿ ;sIt (!),11 and by mt (!) the meet
of s1t (!);s2t (!);￿￿￿ ;sIt (!).12
Now we are ready to give the de￿nition of a Rational Expectations Equilibrium in
this pure exchange economy.
De￿nition 3 (Rational Expectations Equilibrium) (P;x) 2 RNT
+ ￿ RINT is a
Rational Expectations Equilibrium if
(C1) 8i = 1;2;￿￿￿ ;I, xi are information feasible and satisfy no short sales. Denote
the set of all such xi￿ s by Fi (ei;P;x￿i;Si), where Si = (Si1;Si2;￿￿￿ ;SiT).13






(C3) 8t = 1;2;￿￿￿ ;T;8! 2 ￿;
I X
i=1
xit (!) = 0.
11The join jt (!) of s1t (!);s2t (!);￿￿￿ ;sIt (!) is such that (1) 8i = 1;2;￿￿￿ ;I;jt (!) ￿ sit (!) and
(2) for all j0
t (!) satisfying (1), j0
t (!) ￿ jt (!).
12The meet mt (!) of s1t (!);s2t (!);￿￿￿ ;sIt (!) is such that (1) 8i = 1;2;￿￿￿ ;I;sit (!) ￿ mit (!)
and (2) for all m0
t (!) satisfying (1), mt (!) ￿ m0
t (!).
13Since 8xi 2 Fi, xi are information feasible, Fi depends on the information structure Si, the prices
P, and other agents￿trades x￿i. Since xi satisfy no short sales, Fi depends on the endowment ei.
That￿ s why it is written as Fi (ei;P;x￿i;Si).








. It is easy to see that (C2￿ ) is equivalent to (C2).
6(C4) 8t = 1;2;￿￿￿ ;T;Pt (￿) is measurable with respect to jt (!). Formally, 8t =
1;2;￿￿￿ ;T;8! 2 ￿;jt (!) ￿ f!0 : Pt (!0) = Pt (!)g.
Basically, (C1) describes the feasible set of trade for each agent, (C2) says that
each agent maximizes his expected utility given his price-and-trade-re￿ned information,
(C3) requires that the market should clear in equilibrium, and (C4) implies that all
the information contained in price is from the join of the individual information.
2.4 Di⁄erent Concepts of Bubbles
Di⁄erent de￿nitions of bubbles will lead to di⁄erent results even within the same frame-
work. As a base line, we use the concept of expected bubbles, de￿ned in AMP (1993).
As we will see, the stronger the concept of a bubble become, the harder for it to exist
in equilibrium.
De￿nition 4 (Expected Bubble) As in AMP (1993), an expected bubble is said to
exist in state ! at period t if in state ! it is mutual knowledge that the price of the
risky asset at t is higher than the expected dividend an agent will receive, that is












De￿nition 5 (Strong Bubble) As in AMP (1993), a strong bubble is said to exist
in state ! at period t if in state ! it is mutual knowledge that the price of the risky
asset at t is higher than the possible dividend agents will receive, that is
8i = 1;2;￿￿￿ ;I;8!
0 2 s
PX
it (!);Pt (!) > d(!
0)
As is seen above, the concept of strong bubbles strengthens the concept of expected
bubble in a way that it requires the asset price be higher than the maximal possible
dividend. As will be seen below, another way to strengthen the concept of expected
bubble is to require common knowledge instead of mutual knowledge. This requirement
is reasonable since in the real world people￿ s behaviors do not only depend on their
own beliefs, but also depend on others￿beliefs, others beliefs on their own beliefs, and
so on. Therefore, we might expect to see something di⁄erent when common knowledge
is introduced into the concept of bubbles.
De￿nition 6 (Common Expected Bubble) A common expected bubble is said to
exist in state ! at period t if in state ! it is common knowledge that the price of the
risky asset at t is higher than the expected dividend agents will receive, that is
8i = 1;2;￿￿￿ ;I;8!
0 2 m
PX


















7De￿nition 7 (Common Strong Bubble) A common strong bubble is said to exist
in state ! at period t if in state ! it is common knowledge that the price of the risky




t (!);Pt (!) > d(!
0)
2.5 Nonexistence of Common Strong Bubble in Equilibrium
Among the 4 de￿nitions above, clearly common strong bubble is the strongest one. One
may wonder if there can exist such a bubble in a rational expectations equilibrium. The
answer is NO, due to the following proposition.
Proposition 1 Under perfect memory assumption, 8! 2 ￿;8t = 1;2;￿￿￿ ;T;it is im-
possible for a common strong bubble to exist in state ! at period t in any rational
expectations equilibrium.
Proof. Suppose it is possible and 9!;9t such that a common strong bubble exists in
state ! at period t in a rational expectations equilibrium. Then mPX
t (!) is the set of
states where there is common knowledge among agents when ! is realized. Thus we
have 8!0 2 mPX
t (!);Pt (!) = Pt (!0) > d(!0). By the feature of rational expectations
equilibrium, there must exist some agent i for whom buying is at least as good as
selling, which implies that Pt (!) ￿ Ei
￿
Pt+1 (!0)j!0 2 sPX
it (!)
￿
. Therefore, Pt (!) ￿
maxi max!02sPX
it (!) Pt+1 (!0) ￿ max!02mPX
t (!) Pt+1 (!0). Since agents have perfect mem-
ory, we have 8i = 1;2;￿￿￿ ;I;sPX
i(t+1) (!) ￿ sPX
it (!), which implies mPX
t+1 (!) ￿ mPX
t (!).
By induction we have Pt (!) ￿ max!02mPX
t (!) PT+1 (!0) = max!02mPX
t (!) d(!0). Thus
9!￿ 2 mPX
t (!) such that d(!￿) ￿ Pt (!), which causes a contradiction.
The intuition behind the nonexistence of common strong bubble is that if it is
common knowledge that the price today is higher than the highest dividend agents
may receive, then agents might be better o⁄ by selling the asset instead of holding it,
no matter what kind of heterogeneous beliefs they may have. Since everyone wants
to sell, there cannot be a rational expectations equilibrium any more. It is worth
noting that the result of Proposition 1 is independent of the assumption of common
knowledge of trades. In the case of no common knowledge of trades, the result is still
true. The only modi￿cation is replacing the price￿ and-trade-re￿ned information by
the price-re￿ned information. It is also worth noting that the result of Proposition 1
crucially depends on the perfect memory assumption. If we allow for agents to forget
some information they knew before, a common strong bubble may exist in a rational
expectations equilibrium. Such a counterexample is presented in Section 6.
Though under the standard assumption of perfect memory there is no common
strong bubble in any rational expectations equilibrium, an expected bubble, which is
both strong and common expected, as shown in the next section, can exist in a rational
expectations equilibrium of a three-period two-agent economy.
83 Simple Example: Strong Bubbles and Common
Expected Bubbles with Two Agents
3.1 Exogenous Setting
AMP (1993) has shown a strong bubble in a rational expectations equilibrium of a
three-period three-agent economy with the assumption of no common knowledge of
trades. In this section, I will provide a simple example of the existence of strong bubbles
with two agents where trades become automatically common knowledge. Moreover, as
will be shown, the bubble in the example will also be robust to common knowledge in
the expected sense, hence a common expected bubble.
There are 2 agents (A and B), 3 periods (1, 2, and 3) and 8 states (!1, !2, !3, !4,
!5, !6, !7 and !8). Only 2 assets exist in the market: one is money and the other is
called a risky asset. Each share of the risky asset will pay a dividend of amount 4 at
the end of period 3 if the state is either !1 or !4, and will pay nothing otherwise, as
shown in the table below.
State !1 !2 !3 !4 !5 !6 !7 !8
d(!) 4 0 0 4 0 0 0 0
Each agent is endowed with mi unit of money and 1 share of the risk asset at the
beginning of period 1. Agents can trade in each of period 1, 2, and 3. At period 3,
after the trade is made, the dividend is realized, and then the consumption takes place.
Keeping in mind that the asymmetric information is the key to generate bubbles,
we achieve this goal by giving agents di⁄erent information structures. Remind that
agent i￿ s (i = A;B) information about the state in period t (t = 1;2;3) is represented





SA3 = SB3 = ff!1g;f!2g;f!3g;f!4g;f!5g;f!6g;f!7g;f!8gg
At ￿rst glance, this particular structure of information may seem complicated, but
as our analysis goes on, the reason why it is set in this form will become clear. So
far, there are at least three observations: First, at period 3, each agent is perfectly
informed of what the realized state is and hence there is no asymmetric information
then; Second, at period 2, agent A only receives more information when he observed
f!1;!2;!3;!4;!5;!8g at period 1 and agent B only receives more information when
he observed f!1;!2;!4;!5;!6;!8g at period 1; Third, at period 1, if the state !7 is
9realized, each agent knows that he will receive no dividend for sure.16 Hence if the
price is positive at period t = 1 in state ! = !7, there will be a strong bubble, and
that is part of what we are going for.
In order to generate potential gains from trade, we let each agent have a heteroge-
neous belief about the probability distribution of the state, as shown in the table below
with weight W = 1
16.
State !1 !2 !3 !4 !5 !6 !7 !8
￿A 2 1 1 1 2 1 1 7
￿B 1 2 1 2 1 1 1 7
Also, the structure of the beliefs may seem complicated for now, but it will become
clear why it serves for the existence of a bubble in a rational expectation equilibrium.
So far, it is easy to observe that within the two states where there will be a dividend
of 4, agent A puts a higher weight on state !1, agent B puts a higher weight on state
!4. They put the same weight on state !7, and state !8, respectively. The weights
they put on events f!1;!2;!3g and f!4;!5;!6g are also the same, respectively.
3.2 A Rational Expectations Equilibrium with a Bubble
Recall the standard de￿nition given in the last section, and in our example a rational
expectations equilibrium will be a vector (P;x) 2 R
3￿8
+ ￿ R2￿3￿8 such that
(C1) 8i = A;B, xi are information feasible and satisfy no short sales.
(C2) 8i = A;B, xi maximizes player i￿ s expected payo⁄ with respect to his own
price-and-trade-re￿ned information.
(C3) 8t = 1;2;3;8n = 1;￿￿￿ ;8;xAt (!n) + xBt (!n) = 0.
(C4) 8t = 1;2;3;8n;m = 1;￿￿￿ ;8;jt (!n) ￿ f!m : Pt (!m) = Pt (!n)g.
Although there are multiple rational expectations equilibria for this example, the
one with the equilibrium prices and trades given in the following two tables is what we
are interested in - the one in which there is a strong bubble and a common expected
bubble.
State !1 !2 !3 !4 !5 !6 !7 !8
P1 (!) 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
P2 (!) 2 2 2 2 2 2 0 0
P3 (!) 4 0 0 4 0 0 0 0
16Take agent A into consideration for example. When !7 is realized, agent A will have observed
the event f!6;!7g. Since in either state !6 or !7, there is no dividend payment, agent A knows that
he will receive no dividend with probability 1.
108! 2 ￿;xA1 (!) = xB1 (!) = xA3 (!) = xB3 (!) = 0
State !1 !2 !3 !4 !5 !6 !7 !8
xA2 (!) 1 1 1 ￿1 ￿1 ￿1 0 0
xB2 (!) ￿1 ￿1 ￿1 1 1 1 0 0
xA2 (!) + xB2 (!) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
3.2.1 Price-and-Trade-Re￿ned Information
First derive the price￿ and-trade-re￿ned information for each agent in each period. It is
easy to observe from the price table that P1 (!) = 1 8! 2 ￿ and from the trade table
that xA1 (!) = xB1 (!) = 0 8! 2 ￿. This implies that the prices and trades in period
1 reveal no information. Hence SPX
A1 = SA1, SPX
B1 = SB1. Since in period 3, all agents
already have full information about the state before observing the prices and making
the trades,17 the prices and trades in period 3 again, reveal no information. Hence
SPX
A3 = SA3, SPX
B3 = SB3. The only new information revealed by prices and trades at
period 2 is that agents know where they are for sure when the state !7 is realized.
Hence agents￿price￿ and-trade-re￿ned information at period 2 is the following, with









The following graph may give more intuition about the information structure than
the mathematical expression does. In the graph, agent A￿ s information sets are de-
scribed by the black solid curves, agent B￿ s information sets are described by the blue
dotted curves, and dividend paying states are emphasized in gray color.
17Actually there is no trade in period 3 in the equilibrium under study.
11It is worth noting that at period 2, with the price-and-trade-re￿ned information,
agent A is better informed than agent B when event f!4;!5;!6g happens, and agent
B is better informed than agent A when event f!1;!2;!3g happens. We will see soon
that the subgroup of states f!4;!5;!6g is where agent A takes advantage of agent B
by selling the asset he believes is overpriced to agent B, and similarly, the subgroup of
states f!1;!2;!3g is where agent B takes advantage of agent A.
3.2.2 The Existence of Strong and Common Expected Bubbles
Second note that there is a strong bubble at period 1 in state !7 since for agent A,
sPX
A1 (!7) = f!6;!7g, P1 (!7) = 1 > 0 = d(!6) = d(!7), and for agent B, sPX
B1 (!7) =
f!3;!7g, P1 (!7) = 1 > 0 = d(!3) = d(!7). In short, the strong bubble exists at
period 1 in !7 because at that state every agent knows the asset is worthless but with
a positive current price.
In this example, mPX
1 (!7) = ￿. To see that this bubble is robust to common








￿i (!0)d(!0). There are four cases:
1 ! = !7: Agent A observes the event f!6;!7g, agent B observes the event
f!3;!7g, each of them will induce that the expected dividend in period 3 will be
1
20 + 1
20 = 0, which is less to the current price.
2 ! = !6: Agent A observes the event f!6;!7g, and his expected dividend in
period 3 is 0, less than the current price. Agent B observes ￿nf!3;!7g, and his
expected dividend in period 3 is 3
144 + 11
140 = 6
7, less than the current price.
123 ! = !3: Agent B observes the event f!3;!7g, and his expected dividend in
period 3 is 0, less than the current price. Agent A observes ￿nf!6;!7g, and his
expected dividend in period 3 is 3
144 + 11
140 = 6
7, less than the current price.
4 !n 2 ￿nf!3;!6;!7g, Agent A observes the event ￿nf!6;!7g, agent B observes
the event ￿nf!3;!7g, each of them will induce that the expected dividend in
period 3 will be 3
144 + 11
140 = 6
7, which is less to the current price.
Therefore, the bubble at period 1 in state !7 is a common expected bubble. Actu-
ally, the reader can check that in our example the common expected bubble exists at
period 1, not only in state !7, but also in any other state.
3.2.3 Check of Equilibrium Conditions
Last check that the prices and trades described above constitute a rational expectations
equilibrium. We check all the four conditions step by step.
Check (C1): We observe from the trade table the minimum amount of trade at
period 2 is ￿1. By the fact that there is no trade in either period 1 or 3 and that each
agent is endowed with 1 share of the risky asset, the no short sale condition is satis￿ed
for xA and xB. To see if xi are information feasible, it su¢ ces to only look at period 2
since no trade occurs either in period 1 or 3. In period 2, actually each agent￿ s action
remains the same given the same price￿ and-trade-re￿ned information.18 This implies
that xA and xB also satisfy the information feasibility condition.
Check (C2): Maximization of the expected payo⁄ at the beginning of period 1
under the constraints of information feasibility and no short sales, is equivalent to
maximization of the expected payo⁄ in each period given the current price￿ and-trade-
re￿ned information under the same constraints. In period 3, each agent has no incentive
to trade since the price is exactly equal to the dividend for every state. In period 2,
there are in total 4 cases:
(p2-i) 8i 2 fA;Bg, if agent i observes the event f!7g or f!8g, he knows that with
probability 1 the price in period 3 will be 0, which is equal to the current price,
thus he is indi⁄erent between trading or not at period 2, so the equilibrium trade
of 0 maximizes his expected payo⁄ in this case.
(p2-ii) If agent A observes the event f!1;!2;!3g (or if agent B observes the event




40 = 2, which is equal to the current price, thus he is indi⁄erent between trading
18Take agent A for example.
8! = !6;sPX
A2 (!) = f!6g ￿ f!4;!5;!6g = f!0 : xA2 (!0) = xA2 (!)g,
8! 2 f!4;!5g;sPX
A2 (!) = f!4;!5g ￿ f!4;!5;!6g = f!0 : xA2 (!0) = xA2 (!)g,
8! 2 f!1;!2;!3g;sPX
A2 (!) = f!1;!2;!3g = f!0 : xA2 (!0) = xA2 (!)g,
8! 2 f!7;!8g;sPX
A2 (!) = f!g ￿ f!7;!8g = f!0 : xA2 (!0) = xA2 (!)g.
13or not at period 2, so the equilibrium trade of 1 maximizes his expected payo⁄
in this case.
(p2-iii) If agent A observes the event f!4;!5g (or if agent B observes the event f!1;!2g),




less the current price 2, thus he has incentive to sell any of the asset he owns at
period 2, so under the short sale constraint and given there is no trade in period
1, the equilibrium trade of ￿1 maximizes his expected payo⁄ in this case.
(p2-iv) If agent A observes the event f!6g (or if agent B observes the event f!3g), he
knows that with probability 1 the price in period 3 will be 0, which is less the
current price 2, thus he has incentive to sell any of the asset he owns at period
2, so under the short sale constraint and given there is no trade in period 1, the
equilibrium trade of ￿1 maximizes his expected payo⁄ in this case.
In period 1, there are 2 cases:
(p1-i) If agent A observes the event f!6;!7g (or if agent B observes the event f!3;!7g),
he will induce that the expected price in period 2 will be 1
22 + 1
22 = 1, which is
equal to the current price, thus he is indi⁄erent between trading or not at period
1, so the equilibrium trade of 0 maximizes his expected payo⁄ in this case.
(p1-ii) If agent i observes the event other than the one described in (1-i), he will induce
that the expected price in period 2 will be 2￿2+1￿3
14 2 + 7
140 = 1, which is equal
to the current price, thus he is indi⁄erent between trading or not at period 1, so
the equilibrium trade of 0 maximizes his expected payo⁄ in this case.
The above analysis guarantees that the condition (C2) is satis￿ed.
Check (C3) and (C4): It is seen that the market clears in each period at
each state from the table of trades, hence (C3) is satis￿ed. Note that P1 (!) = 1
8! 2 ￿ hence P1 (￿) is measurable with respect to j1 (￿) and that j3 (!) = f!g
8! 2 ￿ hence P3 (￿) is measurable with respect to j3 (!). To see P2 (￿) is measur-
able with respect to j2 (!), note that 8n = 1;￿￿￿ ;6;j2 (!n) ￿ f!1;!2;!3;!4;!5;!6g =
f! : P2 (!) = P2 (!n) = 2g and 8n = 7;8;j2 (!n) ￿ f!7;!8g = f! : P2 (!) = P2 (!n) = 0g
This completes the check that the prices and trades given in the example constitute a
rational expectations equilibrium.
3.3 Discussion
We have shown that, in a simple ￿nite horizon model with asymmetric information
and short sale constraints, a strong bubble and a common expected bubble can exist in
the same period at the same state in a rational expectations equilibrium with common
knowledge of trades, under the same basic setting as in AMP (1993).
It is worthwhile to make some remarks about this simple example.
14(1) The initial distribution of the asset is not e¢ cient. To see this, with zero-trade,








xit (!)[Pt+1 (!) ￿ Pt (!)]
#
would have been mi+ 3
4, while in the equilibrium, each agent￿ s expected payo⁄is
mi + 1. Thus our example does not violate the no-trade theorem and the neces-
sary condition of ex ante ine¢ ciency is satis￿ed here. In fact, as the analysis has
shown, in our example the ones who gain from the trade are the sellers whenever
the trade takes place.
(2) The social welfare is maximized in the rational expectation equilibrium with bub-
bles if there is no initial endowment of money. Note that in our example the social
welfare is maximized when in every state the social planner gives all the assets to
the agent who puts the highest weight on that state. Hence the maximal social
welfare should be 9
8 (m1 + m2)+2. When either agent has positive endowment of
money, the social welfare of the equilibrium outcome is not maximized. However,
if each agent is endowed with no money, then the social welfare is maximized in
equilibrium. To put it in another way, if the social planner is only allowed to real-
locate on the risky asset, then the equilibrium maximizes the sum of the utilities
of the agents. This implies a surprising observation that the rational bubbles do
not necessarily lead to ine¢ ciency.
(3) The short sale constraints are binding at period 2 for the sellers whenever the
trade takes place. In the cases of (p2-iii) and (p2-iv), where agents play the seller￿ s
role, since the expected price for the asset is higher than the current price, agents
would like to take advantage of this and sell as much as they could. If there were
no short sale constraints, an equilibrium would not have been reached under the
current price. This is where the no short sales assumption plays its role.
(4) The asymmetric information functions in the way that even though all agents
know that the asset is overpriced, they are still willing to hold the asset as long
as the information of overpricing is not common knowledge in the strong sense.
And it is this feature that makes a bubble possible in a rational expectations
equilibrium.
(5) For simplicity, the example is constructed in a way that even though the trade is
common knowledge, it reveals no additional information for each agent.
4 An Example of Common Strong Bubbles with
Agents of Imperfect Memory
In Section 2, we have pointed out that the nonexistence result for common strong
bubbles relies heavily upon the assumption of perfect memory. Once this standard as-
15sumption is relaxed, that is to say agents might forget some information they originally
knew, then it is possible to have a common strong bubble in a rational expectations
equilibrium. A simple counter example is constructed below.
4.1 Exogenous Setting
The same as before, there are 2 agents (A and B), 3 periods (1, 2, and 3) and 8 states
(!1, !2, !3, !4, !5, !6, !7 and !8). There are only 2 assets: money and the risky asset.
The dividend distribution over states for the risky asset remains exactly the same as
in Section 3, and is shown in the table below.
State !1 !2 !3 !4 !5 !6 !7 !8
d(!) 4 0 0 4 0 0 0 0
Agents￿endownment are the same as before, that is mi unit of money and 1 unit of
the risky asset. What di⁄ers from the previous example is the information structure.
In period 1, both agents receive the same information, represented by SA1 and SB1 re-
spectively, where SA1 = SB1. When it comes to period 2, both agents forget everything
they knew in period 1, and then they get to reveive some new information, represented
by SA2 and SB2 respectively. In this case, Si2 is no longer necessarily a ￿ner partition
than Si1 is, for i = A;B. In period 3, again as before, each agent is perfectly informed
of what the realized state is. The structure for the information partiontions is shown
in the table below.
SA1 = SB1 = ff!2;!3;!5;!6;!8g;f!1;!4;!7gg
SA2 = ff!1;!2;!3g;f!4;!5g;f!6;!7g;f!8gg
SB2 = ff!4;!5;!6g;f!1;!2g;f!3;!7g;f!8gg
SA3 = SB3 = ff!1g;f!2g;f!3g;f!4g;f!5g;f!6g;f!7g;f!8gg
The heterogeneous belief about the probability distribution of the state, for each
agent, is shown in the table below with weight W = 1
16.
State !1 !2 !3 !4 !5 !6 !7 !8
￿A 2 1 1 1 2 1 3 5
￿B 1 2 1 2 1 1 3 5
4.2 A Rational Expectations Equilibrium with Common Strong
Bubbles
A similar calculation and check procedure will show that the above economy has a
rational expectations equilibrium that is the same as the one we studied in Section 3.
It is characterized by the price table and the trade table below.
16State !1 !2 !3 !4 !5 !6 !7 !8
P1 (!) 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
P2 (!) 2 2 2 2 2 2 0 0
P3 (!) 4 0 0 4 0 0 0 0
8! 2 ￿;xA1 (!) = xB1 (!) = xA3 (!) = xB3 (!) = 0
State !1 !2 !3 !4 !5 !6 !7 !8
xA2 (!) 1 1 1 ￿1 ￿1 ￿1 0 0
xB2 (!) ￿1 ￿1 ￿1 1 1 1 0 0
xA2 (!) + xB2 (!) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Now it is time to look for the common strong bubbles in such an equilibrium.
Observe that at period 1 in any state from the set f!2;!3;!5;!6;!8g, it is common
knowledge that the dividend at period 3 will be 0. Give a positive price 1, it is exactly
the case that it is common knowledge that the price of the risky asset is higher than
the possible dividend agents will receive, and hence there is a common strong bubble
ar period 1 in any state from the set f!2;!3;!5;!6;!8g.
This counterexample shows that perfect memory is an important necessary assump-
tion for the nonexistence of common strong bubbles. In the real world, it is arguable
that not all people have perfect memory. Therefore, a common strong bubble may exist
in an economy of the real life. This seems to be a surprising result, and it provides
an alternative explanation of the existence of bubbles by the assumption of imperfect
memoery, in stead of the assumption of noise traders.
5 General Results
In Section 3, an example of rational bubbles, which is both a strong bubble and a
common expected bubble, is presented in a rational expectations equilibrium with 2
agents. Furthermore, as will be shown next, the assumption of no common knowledge
of trade is not necessary for the existence of bubbles for any ￿nite number of players.
Let SF ￿ ff!gj! 2 ￿g and SF is called the perfect information structure for ￿.
Before constructing bubble examples, we shall make some restrictions on the agents￿
information structure so as to avoid trial bubbles from duplications.
Assumption 1 (Di⁄erent Information Structure) 8i;j = 1;￿￿￿ ;I,8t = 1;￿￿￿ ;T,
Sit;Sjt 6= SF ) Sit 6= Sjt.
The assumption of Di⁄erent Information Structure says that as long as agents don￿ t
have perfect information, there must be somewhere their information di⁄ers from each
other. This assumption rules out the possibility of duplicating identical agents.
17Assumption 2 (Distinct Information Everywhere) 8i;j = 1;￿￿￿ ;I,8t = 1;￿￿￿ ;T,
8! 2 ￿, sit (!);sjt (!) 6= f!g ) sit 6= sjt.
The assumption of Distinct Information Everywhere says that as long as agents
don￿ t have perfect information, their information di⁄ers from each other everywhere.
It is easy to know that Assumption 2 is much stronger than Assumption 1. Assumption
2 implies Assumption 1, but not vice versa.
Assumption 3 (Common Knowledge of Trades) 8i = 1;￿￿￿ ;I,8t = 1;￿￿￿ ;T,
xit is common knowledge.
Based on the assumptions above, two propositions can be made on the existence of
strong bubbles in a rational expectations equilibrium.
Proposition 2 Under Assumption 1 and 3, for any I ￿ 2, there exists an economy
under the framework described in Section 2, with I agents, 3 periods and 3I +2 states,
presenting a bubble, both strong and common expected, in a rational expectations equi-
librium.
Proof. See the appendix.
Proposition 3 Under Assumption 2 and 3, for any I ￿ 2, there exists an economy
under the framework described in Section 2, with I agents, 3 periods and I￿maxf3;Ig+2
states, presenting a bubble, both strong and common expected, in a rational expectations
equilibrium.
Proof. See the appendix.
The strong bubble part of the result is not new, and has been analyzed by AMP
(1993) and Conlon (2004). However, by presenting a bubble, not only strong but also
common expected, the above propositions provide a new answer to what properties of
bubbles we can expect to have in a rational world. The common part of the result is
surprising since it is somewhat counterintuitive that an expected bubble can be robust
to common knowledge in a raitional expecations equilibrium. But actually it is the
common knowledge of the heterogeneous beliefs and the information structures that
guarantees that agents have no incentive to rush in face of bubbles, because by rational
expectations they know that they can take advantage of it in a later period.
It should also be noted that the conclusions above are independent of the assump-
tion of no common knowledge of trade. In Proposition 3 of AMP (1993) paper, the
assumption of no common knowledge of trades was argued as a necessary condition for
the existence of bubbles in a rational expectations equilibrium. The idea of the argu-
ment is the following: Geanakoplos (1992) has argued that with common knowledge of
trades, agents would have behaved in the same way without the private part of their
18information (originally stated as "common knowledge of actions negates asymmetric
information about events"), and then there would be no strong bubbles since there is
no asymmetric information about the states. However, as was pointed out by Conlon
(2004), the conclusion that there are no strong bubbles is only true for the new econ-
omy where every agent has the same information, which is the common part of their
original information. The bubble may still exist in the original economy since in period
1 there is no trade and hence there is still private information.
6 Conclusion
Based on the work of AMP (1993), as well as Conlon (2004), this paper shows that
for any ￿nite number of agents, (1) there is no common strong bubble in any raitonal
expectations equilibrium under the perfect memory assumption; and (2) there exists a
three-period economy with asymmetric information and short sales constraints, where
an expected bubble can exist in a rational expectations equilibrium, and moreover this
bubble is not only a strong bubble, but also a common expected bubble. The ￿rst
result partially answers what properties a bubble cannot have in a rational world, and
the second result tells more about what a bubble might look like, given the results in
AMP (1993) and Conlon (2004).
One direction for future work will be to extend the concept of strong bubbles to
higher orders for any ￿nite number of agents, following the work done in Conlon (2004)
in which an example of higher order bubbles is constructed for the two agents case.
Another direction will be to introduce some irrational agents into the model and to
see whether a common strong bubble can exist in such a setting. Since the bubbles
modeled in this paper are not robust to perturbations of agents￿beliefs in a general
sense, introducing noise into the model might be another good direction.
19Appendix
Appendix 1:
Proof to Proposition 2:
Write ￿ = f!njn = 1;2;￿￿￿ ;3I + 2g. Let ￿D ￿ f!n 2 ￿jn = 3i ￿ 2;i = 1;2;￿￿￿ ;Ig,
￿2W ￿ f!n 2 ￿jn = 3i ￿ 1;i = 1;2;￿￿￿ ;Ig, ￿i ￿ f!3i￿2;!3i￿1;!3ig, ￿
￿
i ￿ ￿inf!3ig =
f!3i￿2;!3i￿1g, i = 1;2;￿￿￿I.
Each share of the risky asset will pay a dividend of amount 4 at the end of period
3 if the state ! 2 ￿D and will pay nothing otherwise. Each agent is endowed with I
units of money and 1 share of the risk asset at the beginning of period 1.
The speci￿c structures of Sit￿ s are given below.
S11 = f￿nf!3I;!3I+1g;f!3I;!3I+1gg













8i = 2;￿￿￿ ;I
Si3 = S
F 8i = 1;2;￿￿￿ ;I





2W if n = 3i ￿ 2 or !n 2 ￿2Wnf!3i￿1g





8i = 1;2;￿￿￿ ;I;W =
1
8I
To see that the belief of agent i is well de￿ned, note that the number of elements
in ￿2W is I, hence there are I states which are put with probability 2W. Since there is
only one state with probability (3I + 2)W, the number of the states with probability
W is 3I+2￿I￿1 = 2I+1. Thus,
X
!2￿
￿i (!) = I￿2W+1￿(4I ￿ 1)W+(2I + 1)￿W =
8IW = 1.
The equilibrium with the prices and trades given below is what we look for - the
one in which there is a strong and common expected bubble at period 1 in state !3I+1.
P1 (!) = 18! 2 ￿
P2 (!n) =
￿





4 if n 2 ￿D
0 otherwise
￿





I ￿ 1 if !n 2 ￿i





8i = 1;2;￿￿￿ ;I
Observe that neither the prices nor the trades reveal any addition information with
the settings above.
It can be similarly checked following the procedures described in the two-agent
example that the above prices and trades constitute a rational expectations equilibrium.
And since at period 1 in state !3I+1, each agent knows that he will receive nothing at
the end of period 3, given the positive price of 1 at period 1, there exists a strong






= ￿. To see that this bubble is robust to common knowl-








￿i (!0)d(!0). Note that for agent 1 (or agent i, i ￿ 2), either
he will observe f!3I;!3I+1g (or f!3i￿3;!3I+1g), or he will observe ￿nf!3I;!3I+1g (or
￿nf!3i￿3;!3I+1g). If it is the ￿rst case, his expected dividend will be 1
20 + 1
20 = 0;




case, the expected dividend is less than the price. Therefore, the bubble at period 1 in
state !3I+1 is a common expected bubble.
However it should noted in the structure above, 8!n 2 ￿nf!3I+1;!3I+2g, at pe-
riod 2 in state !n there are always (I ￿ 1) agents who observes the same event ￿i =
f!3i￿2;!3i￿1;!3ig 19 where i is determined such that !n 2 ￿i. Obviously this violates
Assumption 2. In order to ensure that agents￿information di⁄ers from each other
everywhere when this is no perfect information, the number of the states has to be
great enough to guarantee the existence of bubbles.
Appendix 2:
Proof to Proposition 3:
The case of 2 agents has already been shown in section 3. Here it su¢ ces to consider
the case when I ￿ 3.
Write ￿ = f!njn = 1;2;￿￿￿ ;I2 + 2g. Let ￿D ￿ f!n 2 ￿jn = I (i ￿ 1) + 1;i = 1;2;￿￿￿ ;Ig,







, j;k = 1;2;￿￿￿I.
Again, each share of the risky asset will pay a dividend of amount 4 at the end of
period 3 if the state ! 2 ￿D and will pay nothing otherwise. Each agent is endowed
with I units of money and 1 share of the risk asset at the beginning of period 1.
19Though there is one agent observing f!ng or ￿inf!ng, ￿i is common knowledge in this case.
And this feature holds also for the constructed example under proposition.
21Let aij be the ith row and jth column element of the following I ￿I matrix. Hence
!I(j￿1)+aij is the aijth element in ￿j.
2
6
6 6 6 6 6 6
4
2 3 ￿￿￿ I ￿ 1 I
I 2 ￿￿￿ I ￿ 2 I ￿ 1






3 4 ￿￿￿ I 2
2 3 ￿￿￿ I ￿ 1 I
3
7 7
7 7 7 7 7
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The speci￿c structures of Sit￿ s are given below.















F 8i = 1;2;￿￿￿ ;I

















4I (I ￿ 1)
To see that the belief of agent i is well de￿ned, note that the number of elements
in ￿(I￿1)W is I, hence there are I states which are put with probability (I ￿ 1)W.
Since there is only one state with probability (2I (I ￿ 1) ￿ 1)W, the number of the




I ￿ (I ￿ 1)W + 1 ￿ (2I (I ￿ 1) ￿ 1)W + (I (I ￿ 1) + 1) ￿ W = 4I (I ￿ 1)W = 1.
The equilibrium with the prices and trades given below is what we look for - the
one in which there is a strong and common expected bubble at period 1 in state !
I2+1.
P1 (!) = 18! 2 ￿
P2 (!n) =
￿





4 if n 2 ￿D
0 otherwise
￿





I ￿ 1 if !n 2 ￿i





8i = 1;2;￿￿￿ ;I
22Observe that neither the prices nor the trades reveal any addition information with
the settings above.
It can be similarly checked following the procedures described in the two-agent
example that the above prices and trades constitute a rational expectations equilibrium.
And since at period 1 in state !
I2+1, each agent knows that he will receive nothing at
the end of period 3, given the positive price of 1 at period 1, there exists a strong
bubble in this equilibrium.
Note that mPX
1 (!
I2+1) = ￿. To see that this bubble is robust to common knowl-








￿i (!0)d(!0). Note that for agent 1, either he will observe f!Iki;!I2+1g,
or he will observe ￿nf!Iki;!I2+1g. If it is the ￿rst case, his expected dividend will
be 1
20 + 1




4I(I￿1)￿2 0 = 4
2I￿ 1
I￿1
. In either case, the expected dividend is less than the price.
Therefore, the bubble at period 1 in state !
I2+1 is a common expected bubble.
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